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INTRODUCTION
“Good morning, Your Honor, AA, here on behalf of the United States
government.”1 AA recounted her proudest moment: appearing in federal district
court as an attorney for the Department of Justice (DOJ) in a religious
accommodation case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 There she
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38PC2T93K.
†. Professor of Law, University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law. For
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, thanks go to Kenneth Dean Chestek, Maureen
Johnson, and Brian Larson. I also thank participants at American University Washington
College of Law Mid-Atlantic People of Color Conference, the University of the District of
Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law Scholarship series, and the Legal Writing Institute’s
Sirico Scholars workshop. Brent W. Drummond, Kalani Brown, and Keilah Roberts provided
valuable research assistance. Special thanks to the Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice
editors for their extremely helpful suggestions, particularly Maggie Woods. Finally, I
acknowledge Gregory Fields for upholding and protecting the rights of Muslim Women.
1. AA and I presented at the National Muslim Law Students Association annual conference at
Yale Law School on November 3, 2018. I attentively listened to her story and visualized her
proudly appearing in federal court in full hijab.
2. Id. See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
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stood, an Ivy League graduate and the granddaughter of sharecroppers. She
appeared before the court as an African-American Muslim woman in hijab
representing the government to uphold the constitutional rights of another Muslim
woman.3 The complainant, Safoorah Khan, was employed as a teacher in a small
Illinois school district and had requested a religious accommodation to make the
annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj).4 The school district denied Ms. Khan’s
request.5
Although the employer raised economic hardship as its legal defense, trends
suggest that the school district may have denied Khan’s request because her
secular practices, in its view, did not align with her claim that she had a religious
obligation to make hajj.6 AA successfully settled Khan’s case against her
employer and secured $75,000 for Khan in lost wages.7 I argue that because Khan
did not perform her religion as the employer expected, such as by wearing hijab,
the employer challenged the sincerity of her religious belief.8 Specifically, I argue
that Khan experienced the effects of what I refer to as inverted masking when the
school district denied her request. In the inverted masking paradigm, employers
are more prone to challenge employees’ religious accommodation requests when
the employee is inconsistent in religious practices or fails to perform a religious
identity as the employer would expect. An array of large-scale employment
litigation over discrimination against specifically Muslim employees provides
evidence of the inverted masking paradigm in action.9
Muslims, especially Muslim women, face special difficulties in a postTrump v. Hawaii America.10 Since the election of Donald Trump, assaults against
Muslims are higher even than they were immediately after the September 11,
3. Safoorah Khan filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), which later referred the case to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Complaint at 13,
United States v. Bd. of Educ., 1:10-CV-07900 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2010).
4. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Files Religious Discrimination Lawsuit
Against
Berkeley
School
District
in
Illinois
(Dec.
13,
2010),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-religious-discrimination-lawsuitagainst-berkeley-school-district [https://perma.cc/3TL7-4G7U]; Complaint, supra note 3, at 1.
5. Id.
6. Cf. Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 682 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring that the
plaintiff show more than a “lone unilateral statement” as evidence of sincere religious belief).
In Tiano, the plaintiff failed to prove a bona fide religious belief that she was called to go on
a pilgrimage to Yugoslavia because she “felt [she] was called to go.” Id.
7. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Settles Religious Discrimination Lawsuit
Against
Berkeley
School
District
in
Illinois
(Oct.
13,
2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-settles-religious-discrimination-lawsuitagainst-berkeley-school-district [https://perma.cc/9GEP-J82Y].
8. See Complaint, supra note 3, at 1.
9. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015); Consent Decree,
EEOC v. Swift Aviation Grp., No. CV-12-01867-PHX-NVW (D. Ariz., July 23, 2013); see
generally U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE
EEOC AND RELIGIOUS AND NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION INVOLVING THE MUSLIM,
SIKH,
ARAB,
MIDDLE
EASTERN
AND
SOUTH
ASIAN
COMMUNITIES,
https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-eeoc-and-religious-and-nationalorigin-discrimination-involving (last visited Sept. 21, 2019) [https://perma.cc/VP9Q-ZJJ9].
10. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018) (holding entry restrictions from Muslim-majority
foreign states is a valid exercise of presidential power).
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2001, attacks,11 and 50 percent of Muslims have experienced discrimination.12
Donald Trump has perpetuated negative stereotypes about Muslim women,13 and
some argue that Muslim women are particularly susceptible to hate crimes because
of the intersection of their gender and Muslim identities.14
As a safeguard against mounting employment discrimination, rising antiIslamic sentiments, and new anti-Islamic policies in the United States, Muslims
increasingly engage in the tradition of masking their identity. On airplanes, many
Muslims hesitate to speak Arabic or to carry books on the Middle East, for fear
doing so might trigger the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to
perform extra screenings or prompt airline personnel to remove them from the
plane for additional vetting.15 Some Muslim women stop wearing their
headscarves (hijab) by choice, while others stop as a disguise mechanism.16
Undoubtedly, wearing hijab or the veil has become a visible signal of defiance to
assimilation,17 and their involuntary removal an attempt to mask aspects of an
outsider religious identity.18
In his seminal article Covering, Professor Kenji Yoshino analyzed the
covering of identity in the context of race, sexual orientation, and gender.19 He
also questioned the benefits of assimilation for those who experience identity-

11. Katayoun Kishi, Assaults Against Muslims in U.S. Surpass 2001 Level, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov.
15, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/15/assaults-against-muslims-in-us-surpass-2001-level/ [https://perma.cc/P9YA-82UF].
12. U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, but Continue to Believe in the
American Dream: Findings from Pew Research Center’s 2017 Survey of U.S. Muslims, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (July 26, 2017), https://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/findings-from-pewresearch-centers-2017-survey-of-us-muslims/ [https://perma.cc/D68Q-PC6C].
13. See Creede Newton, Hate Crimes Rose by Nearly 5 Percent in 2016: FBI, AL JAZEERA (Nov.
14,
2017),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/14/hate-crimes-rose-by-nearly-5percent-in-2016-fbi [https://perma.cc/C4R7-K2SS]; see also Karsten Müller & Carlo
Schwarz, From Hashtag to Hate Crime: Twitter and Anti-Minority Sentiment (July 24, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3149103.
14. See Michelle D. Byng, Mediating Discrimination: Resisting Oppression Among AfricanAmerican Muslim Women, 45 SOC. PROBS. 473, 474 (1998).
15. See Neil Vigdor, Delta Fined for Discriminating Against Muslim Passenger, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
27,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/business/delta-airlines-muslimpassengers.html [https://perma.cc/JK2H-QN42]; see also Michael T. Luongo, Traveling While
Muslim
Complicates
Air
Travel,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
7,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/08/business/traveling-while-muslim-complicates-airtravel.html [https://perma.cc/7VKV-6R2B]; WE WEAR THE MASK: 15 TRUE STORIES OF
PASSING IN AMERICA 190–91 (Brando Skyhorse & Lisa Page eds., 2017).
16. See, e.g., Asma Khalid, Lifting the Veil: Muslim Women Explain Their Choice, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (April 21, 2011, 12:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2011/04/21/135523680/lifting-theveil-muslim-women-explain-their-choice
[https://perma.cc/U535-8XZS]
(discussing
women’s reasons to unveil or veil themselves).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 875–79 (2002).
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based discrimination.20 Meanwhile, other scholars, particularly Sara Ahmed,21
Sahar Aziz,22 and Khaled Beydoun,23 have examined assimilation and specifically
Muslim identity markers, including what it means to “act[] Muslim.”24 I build
upon and link these two strains of scholarship by introducing the new theoretical
framework of inverted masking.
Inverted masking is a legal consequence of masking identity, whether
through covering, passing, or converting. Inverted masking’s legal ramifications
emerge when a group masks or misperforms its identity to shield against
discrimination. While most attempts at masking are protective, inverted masking
creates legal barriers when claimants attempt to challenge identity-based
discrimination. I argue that employees, particularly Muslims, who mask their
religious identity or fail to perform their religious identity as employers expect are
more likely to have employers deny their religious accommodation requests under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.25 The scant judicial record suggests that
an employer is more likely to grant a religious accommodation if the request aligns
with their expectations of the religion and the claimant is consistent with her
religious practices.26
Significantly, Title VII provides that an employer may not “discriminate
against any individual with respect to h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment” because of her religion.27 The term “religion” is
broadly defined.28 The Supreme Court has interpreted religion to create an
affirmative duty on employers to accommodate an employee or applicant’s
20. Yoshino, supra note 19, at 876–87. When Kenji Yoshino examined the correlation between
covering of identity and equal protection jurisprudence, he determined that mutable traits, such
as sexual orientation, are offered less stringent protections than immutable identities like race
(strict scrutiny) and gender (intermediate scrutiny). However, Yoshino argued that
assimilation is a form of covering identity that racial minorities, women, and gay people all
experience—a covering of identity that antidiscrimination statutes fail to fully address.
21. See Sara Ahmed, Affective Economies, 22 SOC. TEXT 117, 130–32 (2004).
22. See Sahar F. Aziz, Coercive Assimilationism: The Perils of Muslim Women’s Identity
Performance in the Workplace, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Aziz, Coercive
Assimilationism]; Sahar F. Aziz, From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim American
Women in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191, 216–
17 (2012) [hereinafter Aziz, From the Oppressed].
23. See generally Khaled Beydoun, Acting Muslim, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2018).
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 681–83 (9th Cir. 1998); Jiglov v.
Hotel Peabody, G.P., 719 F. Supp. 2d 918, 927–34 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (finding that the
plaintiff’s leave request for a day of religious service did not create an undue hardship on the
employer and was a protected religious observance, not a personal preference); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting employment discrimination based
on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin).
26. Conceivably, the gap between litigation in this area and the denial of employees’ religious
accommodations is partially attributable to the justice gap that prevents many low- and middleincome employees from challenging employer actions. Significantly, both EEOC and DOJ
have been subjected to backlash for challenging public employers for failing to accommodate
Muslim employees. Under the Trump administration, these cases were likely more prone to
both political backlash and anti-Islam rhetoric.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693–
96 (2014).
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sincerely held religious beliefs unless it creates an undue hardship on the
employer’s business.29 Yet, it is this broad definition of religion, which in essence
amounts to no definition, that has increasingly led employers to scrutinize the
sincerity of an employee’s beliefs.30 The trend suggests that employers are
assessing claimants’ religiosity and consistent application of religious doctrine.31
Since the framing of identity narratives shape policies and judicial decisions,
I examine the different theories of what makes identity and which theory American
law more closely embraces in Part I of this Article. The rest of Part I focuses on
the correlation between ascribed gender identities and the legal barriers associated
with binary classifications of gender, race, and religion. Policies that align with
the binaries of gender (male/female), race (white/non-white), and religion
(Christian/non-Christian) tend to conflict with each other when nondominant
identities converge in individuals—particularly African-American Muslim
women.
Part II surveys forms of identity masking. This survey includes Muslims who
mask to assimilate into society and escape potential discrimination. This Part
provides additional background for the inverted masking thesis. This background
includes contemporary examples of legislated masking, a paradigm in which
individuals mask their identity to benefit from fundamental civil rights in
employment,32 military service,33 and religious practices.34 Part II also discusses
legislation that requires Muslim women to remove visible symbols of religious
29. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76–85 (1977).
30. See United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 722–23 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that a
church’s marijuana possession and distribution were business transactions rather than
sincerely held religious beliefs); cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608–09 (2019) (holding
that a facially neutral statute prohibiting retail businesses from operating on Sundays did not
violate equal protection or the freedom of religion of Orthodox Jewish storeowners whose day
of rest is on Saturday because the statute affected only Orthodox Jewish storeowners who
believed that it is necessary to work on Sunday).
31. See Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. at 703; see also Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 67–69,
79–85.
32. E.g., Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 259–62 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Hobby
Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. at 728–36; see also Seval Yildirim, Freeman v. Dep’t of Highway
Safety & Motor Vehicles and Webb v. City of Philadelphia – Accommodation Tangles in the
Laws Over Hair, in LAW & RELIGION: CASES IN CONTEXT 293, 297–300 (Leslie C. Griffin,
ed., 2010); see also Separation of Church and Cubicle: Religion in the Workplace,
KNOWLEDGE
@
WHARTON
(Apr.
30,
2015),
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/separation-of-church-and-cubicle-religion-inthe-modern-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/UPD5-72FV].
33. E.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that the
Navy’s policy of discharging gay service members did not violate the right to privacy);
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding discharge based on
“homosexual conduct” does not violate the equal protection clause or the right to privacy).
34. E.g., Freeman v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48, 52–57 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2006); see also Yildirim, supra note 32; see generally Religious Garb and Grooming
in the Workplace: Rights and Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
EEOC-NVTA-2014-4, RELIGIOUS GARB AND GROOMING IN THE WORKPLACE: RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
(2014),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/religious-garb-andgrooming-workplace-rights-and-responsibilities
(last
visited
Sept.
27,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/2AF4-VK3J] (explaining exceptions to religious accommodation
requirements).
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identity, such as the hijab and other forms of veiling.
In Part III, I fully introduce the inverted masking paradigm. In this Article,
I limit my focus to inverted masking in religious accommodation claims in the
Title VII context. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that inverted masking can also
occur under the Equal Protection Clause,35 Religious Freedom Restoration Act,36
and other identity-based protections. This Part includes a survey of courts’
scrutiny of sincerity in religious accommodation cases under Title VII where
inverted masking was at play. I show the nexus between claimants’ masked
identity and the courts’ query of the sincerity of claimants’ religious beliefs.
Finally, I prescribe centering African-American37 Muslim women in religious
accommodation litigation as one strategy to break down adverse stereotypes and
fight the legal consequence of inverted masking.
I. THE IDENTITY DICHOTOMY
The relationship between identity and the law is often explored through
various theoretical frameworks, including critical race theory,38 queer theory,39
feminist legal theory,40 and covering theory.41 These frameworks, and many
others, offer both different perspectives on identity formation and performance
and oppositional accounts of how the law addresses marginalized identities.
Aristotle’s law of identity provides a foundation for the concept of identity in logic
and metaphysics.42 His theory suggests that everything has an identity, or it is
nonexistent.43 That identity will remain constant and not change.44 Thus, a “rose
is a rose is a rose.”45 The rose has specific characteristics and traits that help define

35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
37. In this article, the term “African American” is used for Black people whose ancestors were
brought to the Americas as slaves. The word “Black” is used to include Black people who have
a different country of origin.
38. E.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 323-30 (1987) (examining the importance of critical legal
scholarship, presently called critical race theory, to oppressed communities, particularly
regarding the topic of reparations).
39. E.g., Marc R. Poirier, Microperformances of Identity: Visible Same-Sex Couples and the
Marriage Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 3, 9–16 (2008); see generally
Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of
‘Sex,’ ‘Gender’ and ‘Sexual Orientation’ in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L.
REV. 3, 344–377 (1995) (explaining queer theory and offering strategic goals to achieve sexual
equality).
40. E.g. Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist
Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25, 43 (1990) (arguing that feminist theory should not be
preoccupied with an individual’s differences but should focus on unity and common ground
against male tyranny).
41. See generally Yoshino, supra note 19.
42. M.A.R. HABIB, HEGEL AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LITERARY THEORY 72–73 (2019).
43. See ARISTOTLE, CATEGORIES. ON INTERPRETATION. PRIOR ANALYTICS. 3a 10–13; 3b 34; 8a
19 (Jeffrey Henderson, ed., H. P. Cooke & Hugh Tredennick trans., 1973).
44. Id.
45. GERTRUDE STEIN, GEOGRAPHY AND PLAY, 187 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1993) (1922).
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its existence.46
Social scientists, such as Erving Goffman, offer other relevant paradigms
that have influenced how legal scholars consider the correlation between identity
and the law.47 Specifically, Goffman’s scholarship analogizes identity formation
to the interaction an actor has with an audience.48 In the theatrical realm,
performers develop their characters and mold the delivery to meet audience
expectations. Thus, unlike the Aristotelian law of identity, Goffman proffered that
established social norms may shift how an audience interprets a fixed situation.49
Additionally, because audiences anticipate that narratives will meet existing
expectations, an audience may interpret a performance differently from how the
performer intended.50 The actor may similarly give the audience what it wants,
meeting performance expectations, even when those expectations deviate from the
performer’s authentic self.51
Though Goffman’s concept of identity performance reflects the real-life
nuances of identity, the law more closely adopts Aristotle’s law of identity. Like
the Aristotelian law of identity, the law seeks to determine the characteristics of
whatever is at issue.52 It then groups parties, causes of actions, or fact patterns
based on unifying characteristics that then determine that claims or groups of
people are somehow the same.53 Foundationally, the law operates on this sameness
principle. For example, the concept of stare decisis is what keeps the wheels of
justice turning: similar facts lead to the same legal result.54 Even though one
defendant may have stolen an apple and, in a subsequent case, another defendant
stole an orange, the stolen objects’ sameness as fruits makes the cases analogous
and justifies a court following precedent.55 At trial, to authenticate a document
under Federal Rules of Evidence 901, the attorney must prove the document is
what it purports to be by demonstrating sameness between what is presented at
trial and the original document.56 Patent law similarly requires the patent owner to
demonstrate a sameness to show a violation of a patent.57
The sameness principle is also how the Title VII paradigm promotes equality
by protecting individuals who are similarly situated with immutable traits, such as

46. See Monica Beyer, Characteristics of the Rose Flower, HUNKER (March 21, 2018),
https://www.hunker.com/13427234/characteristics-of-the-rose-flower
[https://perma.cc/7YR4-X7C7].
47. See, e.g., Paul Campos, Lawyers and Spoiled Identity, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 73 (2015).
48. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
49. Id. at 17–22.
50. Id. at 34–42.
51. Olivier Klein, Russell Spears & Stephen Reicher, Social Identity Performance: Extending the
Strategic Side of SIDE, 11 PERSONALITY & PSYCH. REV. 28, 33 (2007).
52. See Lindsay Head, Standing (Near)by Things Decided, 15 LEGAL COMMC’N. & RHETORIC:
JALWD 189, 202–04 (2018).
53. See Identity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
54. See Head, supra note 52, at 203.
55. See id. at 204.
56. FED. R. EVID. 901.
57. See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 526–27 (1871).
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race, gender, and religion.58 However, categories grounded in group sameness are
limiting and overlook individuals who uniquely self-identify differently than their
societal group identity or have intersectional identities.59 Additionally, group
sameness is embedded with stereotypes and delineates based on whether an
individual is a member of the dominant group or not: male or female; white or
non-white; and, to a lesser degree, Christian or non-Christian. Below, I focus on
the ascribed binary classifications in gender and the intersectional identity of being
a Black Muslim woman.
A. Binary Gender Identity60
A challenge with binary gender construction is that it ascribes characteristics
to men and women that do not reflect social realities.61 Both the law and broader
society are slowly recognizing gender nonbinary, gender neutral, gender
nonconforming, and other self-defining gender identities.62 For those whom the
law classifies as women, the classification is supposedly supported by biological
differences that align men as eminent and women as their subset. Beyond the
female binary biological categorization, women’s gender identity is also
58. In this article, I do not address immutability in equal protection cases as distinguished from
Title VII. In the constitutional law context, courts and scholars have extensively challenged
the application of the immutability doctrine in equal protection jurisprudence, but the
inferential immutability standard is frequently used in the Title VII context. For discussion on
the issues, see, e.g., Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious Conduct and the Immutability Requirement:
Title VII’s Failure to Protect Religious Employees in the Workplace, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y &
L. 453, 457–58 (2010); Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2 (2015); Sandi
Farrell, Toward Getting Beyond the Blame Game: A Critique of the Ideology of Voluntarism
in Title VII Jurisprudence, 92 KY. L.J. 483, 515 (2004).
59. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. ___, 8–9 (2020) (unpacking Title VII’s focus on
individuals distinct from groups they may identify with); see also W. James Booth,
Communities of Memory: On Identity, Memory, and Debt, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 249, 250–
51 (1999) (discussing facets of identity and identity evolution across time); Lauren Sudeall
Lucas, Undoing Race? Reconciling Multiracial Identity with Equal Protection, CALIF. L. REV.
1243, 1266–67 (2014) (discussing the intersectional identity of multiracial individuals).
60. I recognize the depth of identity within a gender context, including gender nonbinary and
gender nonconforming identities. However, I do not fully explore these issues in this Article
because, as a Critical Race Theorist, I believe in speaking to one’s experiences. Indeed, I center
myself in this article as a cisgender Black Muslim woman. I reference other genders as not to
render them invisible.
61. See Adam R. Chang and Stephanie M. Wildman, Gender In/Sight: Examining Culture and
Constructions of Gender, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 43, 57–58 (2017); see, e.g., Casey Parks,
Gresham-Barlow School District Agrees to Pay Transgender Teacher, Add Gender-Neutral
Bathrooms after Complaint, OR. LIVE (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://www.oregonlive.com/education/2016/05/gresham_barlow_transgender_tea.html
[https://perma.cc/TB7V-XA4M]; A Map of Gender-Diverse Cultures, PUB. BROAD. SYS.
(Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/independentlens/content/two-spirits_map-html/
[https://perma.cc/5JU5-JH23] (describing, with an interactive map, various societies around
the world that include more than two genders as a part of their language, culture, or religion).
62. See, e.g., 65 D.C. Reg 11402 (Oct. 9, 2018) (allowing applicants for a license, permit, or
identification card to choose nonbinary as a gender marker); S.B. 179 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2017) (allowing nonbinary as a gender marker option for California birth certificates, driver’s
licenses, or identification cards); Zzyym v. Kerry, 220 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2016) (holding that
the U.S. State Department’s passport denial of an intersex individual was arbitrary and
capricious).
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embedded in other restrictive stereotypes, including defining women as nurturing,
fragile, emotionally unstable, helpless, and vulnerable.63 These identity
stereotypes have adversely affected women’s educational opportunities,64 legal
outcomes,65 and employment practices.66 Yet, nonconformity to binary gender
stereotypes has likewise disadvantaged women and others who do not fit the
binary classification system.
In employment situations, when women violated gendered stereotypes and
acted too “manly” or attempted to do “man’s work,” they jeopardized their career
opportunities.67 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins68 laid the foundation for challenging
the use of gendered interpersonal skills as the basis for making partner in an
accounting firm, but overgeneralized identities continue to affect women
adversely in the labor market.69 Employers silence women in meetings, do not
accept women’s professional judgment, and do not credit women for their work.70
Consequently, women are slower to assume leadership positions in the workplace

63. Vulnerability in feminist legal theory is extensive, and my reference is not comprehensive of
the depth of analysis required to cover the topic fully. Instead, I argue that vulnerability
remains a critical aspect of women’s identity in the law. See generally Maritza I. Reyes,
Professional Women Silenced by Men-Made Norms, 47 AKRON L. REV. 897, 900, 922 n.221
(2015) (explaining a woman’s invisibility and analyzing law professor Anita Hill’s story as an
example of a woman’s vulnerability and “place” in man’s society).
64. In the 1870s, the first women were being admitted to law school. See generally D. Kelly
Weisberg, Barred from the Bar: Women and Legal Education in the United States 1870–1890,
28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 485, 484–94 (1976). However, in 1873, with Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
130 (1873), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state did not have to admit a married woman
to the bar. While attending law school, women experienced enduring discrimination in the
classroom. See, e.g., Nancy S. Erickson, Legal Education: The Last Academic Bastion of Sex
Bias?, 10 NOVA L. REV. 457 (1986); JILL ABRAMSON & BARBARA FRANKLIN, WHERE THEY
ARE NOW: THE STORY OF THE WOMEN OF HARVARD LAW 1974 10–11 (1986); CYNTHIA
EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 50, 60–61 (1981).
65. See Andrea L. Miller, Expertise Fails to Attenuate Gendered Biases in Judicial DecisionMaking, 10 SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 228, 228–29 (2018).
66. See Kathleen Brown, ‘Changed… into the Fashion of a Man’: The Politics of Sexual
Difference in a Seventeenth-Century Anglo-American Settlement, 6 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 171,
191–92 (1995) (recounting how changing symbols of identity, such as hair and dress, allowed
women to enter more lucrative fields).
67. Binary gender identity classification has been reflected in employment practices that supported
feminine identity in dress, hair, makeup, vocal tone, and other gendered labels. Partners at
Price Waterhouse criticized Ann Hopkins for her aggressive behavior and told her to “walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry.” Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.C. 1985),
rev’d, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1209 (8th Cir.
1985) (claimant argued that employer removed her as co-anchor because she was “too old, too
unattractive, and not deferential enough to men”).
68. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1117.
69. See generally Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage
Labor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1165–66 (1991). But see Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes
Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 54 (2010).
70. See Sheryl Sandberg & Adam Grant, Speaking While Female, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/opinion/sunday/speaking-while-female.html
[https://perma.cc/TUS5-KSKL]; Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An
Empirical Study of State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 54–55 (1996).
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and often feel invisible at work.71 Both situations enhance the gender wage gap.72
Historically, gender-based identity stereotypes have also supported laws
denying women opportunities to serve on juries73 and in the military,74 limiting
the number of hours women could work,75 and restricting the type of work they
could perform.76 The nurturer stereotype continues to influence courts in child
custody matters and employers’ hiring practices, leading employers to refrain from
hiring women with young children77 and to deny paternity leave to fathers. This
stereotype assumes that mothers care for their children during the infants’
formative months.78 Analogously, judges have relied on this nurturer stereotype to
presume mothers would have physical custody, limiting women’s economic
stability.79
The gendered identity marker of vulnerability also created a body of law that
endorsed women needing permission to marry,80 own property,81 and seek a

71. See Nikki Waller, How Men & Women See the Workplace Differently, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27,
2016),
http://graphics.wsj.com/how-men-and-women-see-the-workplace-differently/
[https://perma.cc/H3HY-DTGM].
72. See Nikki Graf, Anna Brown & Eileen Patten, The Narrowing, but Persistent, Gender Gap in
Pay, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/03/22/gender-pay-gap-facts/ [https://perma.cc/N9F3-A564].
73. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding Louisiana’s systemic pattern of
excluding women from jury duty violated the Sixth Amendment).
74. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding national security interests to
exclude women from the military).
75. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (ruling that restricting women’s work hours
was constitutional); See also Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915).
76. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding state law that prohibited women
from being licensed bartenders in certain cities); W.C. Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 91 N.E. 695
(Ill. 1910) (upholding state law that regulated the employment of women in mechanical
establishments or factories to limited hours).
77. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (holding under Title VII an
employer could not refuse to hire women with young children but agree to hire men with young
children).
78. Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1077–79 (1994).
79. Child support payments do not adequately consider the lost wages women experience when
they are pregnant. Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REV. 647, 651–52; see, e.g., Taylor
v. Finck, 211 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Ark. 2005) (explaining Arkansas law requiring that, when
calculating expenses due to a mother from the father, lost wages normally would not be
included). Hourly workers are often unable to work overtime or evening shifts with higher pay
because of their childcare needs. See Sandra Alcaide & Lynne Marie Kohm, Obergefell: A
Game-Changer for Women, 14 AVE MARIA L. REV. 99, 106 (2016) (describing the
“motherhood wage penalty” as “lost wages due to costs and time of childcare and household
chores”).
80. See JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 48
(1987); see also Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature
‘Deceit’”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 382 n.25 (1993)
(clarifying Roman law’s definition of rape to mean marriage without a father’s consent).
81. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Protecting Them from Themselves: The Persistence of Mutual Benefits
Arguments for Sex and Race Inequality, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1464, 1497 (2009).
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divorce.82 Some states continue to require fault for divorce,83 a standard that
romanticizes paternalism and often leaves women with limited options and legal
protections.84 In fact, fault divorces have largely equated to men needing to grant
women permission for the divorce.85
Although the identity marker of vulnerability has largely failed women and
created glass ceilings in board rooms, vulnerability has paradoxically protected
white women and uplifted them.86 In claims of intimate partner violence where
white women allege men abused them, courts are more likely to believe
complainants because of their perceived vulnerability.87 Significantly, intimate
partner violence often revolves around issues of power and control, with women
largely being the subject of another’s control.88 The control may manifest through
82. See, e.g., Joseph A. Ranney, Anglicans, Merchants, and Feminists: A Comparative Study of
the Evolution of Married Women’s Rights in Virginia, New York, and Wisconsin, 6 WM. &
MARY J. OF RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 493, 495 (2000) (describing the evolution of
property rights for women in Virginia, New York, and Wisconsin).
83. See generally DEMIE KURZ, FOR RICHER, FOR POORER: MOTHERS CONFRONT DIVORCE 24
(1995) (providing a thorough examination of the costs and consequences of divorce for
women); see also Marion Crain, “Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?” Marriage and
Breadwinning in Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1877, 1886–87 n.48 (1999)
(explaining that divorce was allowed if one spouse was at fault for having committed specified
violations).
84. Justice Brennan argued that romanticizing the idea that society needs to protect women has
resulted, “in practical effect, [to] put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.” Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973); see Pamela J. Smith, Part I—Romantic Paternalism –
The Ties That Bind Also Free: Revealing the Contours of Judicial Affinity for White Women,
3 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 107, 113–16 (1999) (describing the restrictions of romantic
paternalism).
85. See NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY
GENERATION TO THE VICTORIANS 61 (The Regents of the University of California eds., 1999)
(arguing that fault divorce “invested wives with a measure of legal independence and then
rhetorically obscured it or degraded it”); see, e.g., Alison D. Morantz, There’s No Place Like
Home: Homestead Exemption and Judicial Constructions of Family in Nineteenth-Century
America, 24 L. & HIST. REV. 245, 266–67 (2006) (describing Byers v. Byers, 21 Iowa 268
(1866), where a woman fought to receive the remainder of her allotted $2,000 for “ceas[ing]
to be a member of [her former husband’s] family,” but national sentiment was that divorce
should be allowed for more than a short list of reasons); but see Allen M. Parkman, The
Contractual Alternative to Marriage, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 125, 127 (2005) (arguing that fault
divorces encouraged couples to make their marriage work, rather than abandoning marriage
quickly with a no-fault divorce).
86. Vulnerability has also led to white women prevailing when they raised charges of rape against
Black men. However, race is likely a more dominant factor. See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1250–51 (1991).
87. See Venessa Garcia & Patrick McManimon, Intersectionality and Intimate Partner Violence:
Barriers
Women
Face,
TIKKUN
(Feb.
8,
2016),
https://www.tikkun.org/blog/2016/02/08/intersectionality-and-intimate-partner-violencebarriers-women-face/ [https://perma.cc/598W-XJRA] (describing how different groups
experience intimate partner violence differently).
88. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 3–4, 128–30 (1978)
(describing accounts where people testified that “women have always been subordinated to
men and their brutalization is a direct byproduct of that subordination” and that the “power
relationship between husband and wife” results in intimate partner violence). Certainly, men
are also survivors of intimate partner violence. Judges more frequently denied men protective
orders based on assumptions about male identity that determine men are neither vulnerable nor
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physical, emotional, verbal, psychological, or financial abuse.89
Support for legal protections began when the domestic violence movement
identified women as vulnerable and in need of protection.90 However, these same
paternalistic stereotypes led judges to advise women to return to their abusers and
work things out.91 Systemic reform and the development of community responses
to intimate partner violence improved judges’ understanding of the power and
control factors embedded in intimate partner violence.92 These shifts in attitudes,
largely about women’s identity, increased the number of protective orders courts
now grant.93 However, because vulnerability is associated with women’s identity,
men and those who are gender nonconforming or gender nonbinary are less likely
to prevail when filing protective orders against women or other men.94
In the Title VII context, courts continue to assess claims through a binary
lens of whether employers treat men and women differently.95 As a solution to

89.
90.
91.

92.

93.

94.

95.

powerless. Cf. ELLEN PENCE & MICHAEL PAYMAR, EDUCATION GROUPS FOR MEN WHO
BATTER: THE DULUTH MODEL 6 (1993) (explaining that under the Duluth model, battered
males are believed to have a better ability to leave relationships safely).
See PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 88, at 3.
A. Rachel Camp, Pursuing Accountability for Perpetrators of Intimate Partner Violence: The
Peril (and Utility?) of Shame, 98 B. U. L. REV. 1677, 1724–26 (2018) (describing common
explanations for and stereotypes about people affected by intimate partner violence).
See, e.g., Dana Harrington Conner, To Protect or to Serve: Confidentiality, Client Protection,
and Domestic Violence, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 877, 888, n.36 (2006); see also Judith E. Koons,
Gunsmoke and Legal Mirrors: Women Surviving Intimate Battery and Deadly Legal
Doctrines, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 617, 662–665 (2006) (providing an explanation of some reasons
why a person may remain in an abusive relationship); see also JESSICA L. GOLDMAN,
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 94–101 (Karin L. Swisher & Carol Wekesser eds., 1994)
(explaining how a judge who does not understand intimate partner violence could “fall into
the old trap of blaming the victim and impos[ing] lenient sentences”).
See, e.g., Melissa L. Breger, Reforming by Re-Norming: How the Legal System Has the
Potential to Change a Toxic Culture of Domestic Violence, 4 J. LEGIS. 170, 193–98 (2017)
(detailing how New York, New Jersey, and federal laws have changed to combat domestic
partner violence); Remla Parthasarathy, Identifying and Depicting Culture in Intimate Partner
Violence, 22 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & SOC. POL’Y 71, 92–93 (2014) (explaining how the Wheel
has changed the evaluation of intimate partner violence in civil and criminal trials).
See, e.g., JAKE FAWCETT, KELLY STARR & ANKITA PATEL, NOW THAT WE KNOW: FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE WASHINGTON STATE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FATALITY
REVIEW 21 n.24 (2008) (reporting a 53 percent increase in a county in Washington State in
petitions requested and temporary protection orders granted when using trained advocates).
See, e.g., Eric Stiles, Ivonne Ortiz & Casey Keene, Serving Male-Identified Survivors of
Intimate Partner Violence, NAT’L RES. CTR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 3–4, 8 (July 2017),
https://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/2017-07/NRCDV_TAGServingMaleSurvivors-July2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/84KQ-2BGG]
(providing
an
explanation of how providers can address the experiences of intimate partner violence for
people who do not identify as women). It is worth noting that these conceptions of gender also
make it hard for members of same-sex couples to receive protective orders. Jacquie Andreano,
The Disproportionate Effect of Mutual Restraining Orders on Same-Sex Domestic Violence
Victims, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1047, 1053 (2020).
See Michael L. Vasu & Ellen Storey Vasu, Gender Stereotypes and Discriminatory Behaviors
Toward Female Attorneys: The North Carolina Case, 13 CAMPBELL L. REV. 183, 185 (1991)
(“Many of the barriers to equal participation by women are embedded in the history of women
and the law”). Dicta in the Supreme Court’s new decision in Bostock v. Clayton County
acknowledges the historical binary nature of Title VII: “[W]e proceed on the assumption that
‘sex’ signified what the employers suggest, referring only to biological distinctions between
male and female.” Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. ___ (2020).
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binary identity stereotypes, such as vulnerability, some second-wave feminists
promoted a sameness theory to support equality for women.96 However, feminists
have largely disagreed on whether to promote women as being the same, and
having the same rights, as men.97 The sameness versus difference paradigm
continues to plague the women’s movement.98
In the law, the sameness paradigm overlooks employment policies that
disproportionately affect women. For example, cases challenging the exclusion of
pregnancy from health care initially failed under a sameness framework.99 Height
and weight requirements in employment that discriminate against women also
initially failed.100 Sex-differentiated pension contributions failed too, despite
employers’ arguments that women live longer.101 The sameness model also
ignores the need for equity to address the ramifications of systemic gender-based
discrimination and the ongoing harm of past discrimination.102 Thus, while
defining women as the same as men in employment may narrow employment
disparities, it will never allow women to “catch up.”103 Instead, the sameness
paradigm continues to promote a flawed gender identity equality model that
overlooks the principles of equity.104 Accordingly, inherent systemic disparities
have supported male-dominated power systems in employment contexts,
including coercing women to remain silent to uphold men’s power in sexual

96. RUTH ROSEN, THE WORLD SPLIT OPEN: HOW THE MODERN WOMEN’S MOVEMENT
CHANGED AMERICA 111 (2000).
97. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER (1989) (discussing challenges for
treating women similarly to men in the reproductive context); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter,
(Un)Equal Protection: Why Gender Equality Depends on Discrimination, 109 NW. U. L. REV.
1, 22–26 (2015).
98. Abby Vesoulis, Women First Marched to Challenge Trump. Now They Are Challenging Each
Other, TIME (Jan. 19, 2019), https://time.com/5505787/womens-march-washingtoncontroversy/ [https://perma.cc/ST6B-K3F4].
99. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974) (overturned by statute); Walter L.
Stiehm, Poverty Law: Access to Healthcare and Barriers to the Poor, 4 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH
L.J. 279, 301–03 (2001); Shilpa Phadke, Jamila Taylor, & Anusha Ravi, How Trump’s FY
2019 Budget Hurts Women, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2018/02/15121832/fy19Budget-Womenfactsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TLQ-2WHA]; see also Fact Sheet: New Trump Rule Would
Take Away Women’s Health Care and Reproductive Rights, HEALTH CARE FOR AM. NOW!
(May 23, 2018), http://healthcareforamericanow.org/resources/factsheets/fact-sheet-newtrump-rule-take-away-womens-health-care-reproductive-rights
[https://perma.cc/7UE67WRN]; see generally 42 C.F.R. § 59 (2018).
100. See generally Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding a district court decision
ruling that statutory minimum height and weight requirements for positions in the Alabama
prison system discriminated based on sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
42 U.S.C. § 1983).
101. See, e.g., Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
102. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 97, at 1–8 (arguing overcoming gender-based
stereotypes and providing incentives for fathers to share childcare will enhance women’s
economic position).
103. See, e.g., Graf et al., supra note 72.
104. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 97, at 20–26 (highlighting the judicial and legislative
evolution of sameness model and its effect on gender equity).
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harassment and sexual assault cases.105
B. Black and African-American Women: Race Intersects with Gender
Before “intersectionality” was a common term in critical race theory,106 Nina
Simone sang of “Four Women”: Peaches, Sweet Thing, Aunt Sarah, and
Saffronia.107 Each woman represented a Black woman stereotype: the angry Black
woman, the Jezebel, the mammy, and the beautiful mulatto.108 “Four Women”
reflected the inimitable identity-based challenges African-American women
experience based on their joint gender and racial identity. Nina Simone’s women
are tough, not vulnerable like white women.109
The absence of this vulnerability narrative has important legal significance
for Black women.110 In intimate partner violence cases, Black women are less
likely to secure a protective order and consistently have less favorable results than
white women.111 In the criminal justice system, Black women are eight times more
likely to be incarcerated than white women.112 Perceptions that Black women are,
as Simone put it, “strong enough to take the pain inflicted again and again”113 have
also led to poor medical treatment and denial of pain medication in life-threatening
circumstances.114 Medical practitioners question Black women when they
105. See generally ELYSE SHAW, ARIANE HEGEWISCH & CYNTHIA HESS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AND ASSAULT AT WORK: UNDERSTANDING THE COSTS (2018) (explaining the
disproportionate weight on women when establishing workplace sexual harassment).
106. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 86, at 1242. But see Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice
to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 15–17 (1991).
107. NINA SIMONE, Four Women, on WILD IS THE WIND (Philip Records 1966).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Pamela J. Smith, Teaching the Retrenchment Generation: When Sapphire Meets
Socrates at the Intersection of Race, Gender, and Authority, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
53 (1999); see also Mari J. Matsuda, supra note 38 (discussing “the similar perspectives and
goals of people of color and critical legal scholars”).
110. Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw’s seminal article, Mapping the Margins, explains how white
feminists often overlook the racial hierarchy of oppression. Crenshaw, supra note 86, at 1244,
n.8; see also Smith, supra note 109, at 164–66 (analyzing the microaggressions surrounding
Black women in academia, who are criticized for their normative behavior. For example, when
exercising authority, white professors are viewed as confident, vocal, and assertive while
Black professors are characterized as aggressive, arrogant, and combative).
111. See Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Employers Know Best? The Application of Workplace Restraining
Orders to Domestic Violence Cases, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 175, 206–07 (2014); c.f.
Symposium, Employers Know Best? The Application of Workplace Restraining Orders to
Domestic Violence Cases, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 175, 204–07 (2014) (referencing a Black
woman’s intimate partner violence experience where a judge failed to extend her protective
order and three weeks later her batterer set her on fire); see also, Adele M. Morrison,
Deconstructing the Image Repertoire of Women of Color: Changing the Domestic Violence
(Dis)Course: Moving from White Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1061, 1082–83 (2006) (stating that to most people, a “‘battered woman’ is white,” because a
stereotypical woman of color “like[s] to fight,” is “hot blooded,” or is “trained for this”).
112. Priscilla A. Ocen, Punishing Pregnancy: Race, Incarceration, and the Shackling of Pregnant
Prisoners, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1239, 1251 (2012).
113. SIMONE, supra note 107.
114. Kelly M. Hoffman, Sophia Trawalter, Jordan R. Axt & M. Norman Oliver, Racial Bias in Pain
Assessment and Treatment Recommendations, and False Beliefs about Biological Differences
between Blacks and Whites, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 4296, 4296 (Apr. 4, 2019).
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describe their pain, provide flawed pain assessment and treatment plans, deny
medical services, and believe Black women have a higher pain threshold than
white women.115
This same perceived absence of vulnerability affects Black women in sexual
assault and rape cases, where they are also less likely to be believed than white
women.116 For example, Anita Hill’s grueling experience during Justice Clarence
Thomas’s Supreme Court confirmation hearing117 received renewed examination
along racial and gendered lines when Christine Blasey Ford testified during Justice
Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing.118 Both hearings reinforced the gender
biases in Congress and in Supreme Court appointments.119 They also triggered
wounds for many women who similarly violated the expectation to remain silent
in sexual harassment and assault cases. Anita Hill’s testimony also reinforced the
heightened scrutiny Black women face in sexual harassment and assault cases—
more skepticism, more questions about credibility, and less compassion.120
The impacts of the intersection of gender and race also allow white women
to advance further in their legal careers than Black women.121 While white women
are fighting for a seat at the table, qualified Black women never even receive an
invitation to the meeting.122 At large law firms, once Black women make partner,
115. See id. at 4299–300.
116. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 86, at 1269–71.
117. For context of the intersectional issues at play during the Anita Hill hearings, see generally
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING
POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY
402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
118. The Republicans who questioned both Hill and Ford were all white men. Sabrina Siddiqui,
Kavanaugh Hearing Recalls Clarence Thomas Case: Will History Repeat Itself?, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep/27/brett-kavanaughclarence-thomas-anita-hill-hearings [https://perma.cc/UX6J-NN55] (writing “Republicans on
the panel are all white men – again”); see also Jill Filipovic, How Far Have We Really Come
Since
Anita
Hill?,
VANITY
FAIR
(Sept.
20,
2018),
https://www.vanityfair.com/style/2018/09/christine-blasey-ford-anita-hill
[https://perma.cc/6955-5DJZ]; see generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, We Still Haven’t Learned
From
Anita
Hill’s
Testimony,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
27,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/opinion/anita-hill-clarence-thomas-brett-kavanaughchristine-ford.html [https://perma.cc/MJ8U-6H3W].
119. See Americans Divided on Kavanaugh’s Nomination to the Supreme Court, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(July 17, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/07/17/americans-divided-onkavanaughs-nomination-to-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/32F6-AMX9] (finding that
32 percent of men opposed the nomination compared with 40 percent of women who opposed
the nomination).
120. See Peter Baker & Carl Hulse, Echoes of Anita Hill, but in a Different Era for Women, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/us/politics/anita-hill-clarencethomas-brett-kavanaugh-christine-blasey-ford.html
[https://perma.cc/YLP6-6LKG];
Crenshaw, supra note 118 (analyzing the intersectional component of the Clarence Thomas
hearing, including Hill being disbelieved and scrutinized); PBS NewsHour, Demonstrators
Chant, ‘We Believe Anita Hill! We Believe Dr. Blasey!’, YOUTUBE (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AUXfruZEsG0 [https://perma.cc/5RK6-T8TH].
121. See generally Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (1991).
122. Social stratification by gender and race shows white women still represent less than 19 percent
of attorneys serving on executive and management committees at law firms, compared to
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they report that other partners regularly alienate them from firm decisions, new
client meetings, and other opportunities that would advance their economic
position.123 This antagonistic work environment forces many Black women to
leave law firms.124 Disparity in employment opportunities for Black women is not
limited to the legal field. Overall, Black women earn 11.7 percent less than white
women.125 This convergence of gender and race is yet another source of
discrimination based on identity stereotypes.126
C. Muslim Women: Religious Identity Intersects with Gender
The Constitution defines a national identity that limits government intrusion
in religious liberty.127 However, the Founding Fathers created this national identity
when religious freedom for everyone, including Muslims, Jews, and Catholics,
was never fully contemplated.128 Despite a proffered narrative about individual
rights and pluralism, both scholars and courts have explored whether the United
States is, in fact, a Christian nation.129 The Trump Administration’s ban preventing
visa holders and refugees from Muslim-majority countries from entering the
United States forced scholars and civil rights advocates to reconsider this

123.

124.

125.

126.
127.
128.
129.

women of color who represented less than 3 percent of law firms’ leadership positions. Tracy
Jan, The Legal Profession Is Diversifying. But Not at the Top, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2017,
5:08
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/11/27/the-legalprofession-is-diversifying-but-not-at-the-top/?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/TT4N-ABDZ].
Liane Jackson, Minority Women Are Disappearing from BigLaw—and Here’s Why, ABA
JOURNAL (Mar. 1, 2016, 12:15 AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/minority_women_are_disappearing_from_bigl
aw_and_heres_why [https://perma.cc/P4FG-MC4M].
See id. Black women only represent 0.7 percent of law firm partners at top firms. INSTITUTE
FOR INCLUSION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (IILP) REVIEW: THE STATE OF DIVERSITY AND
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“Tipping Point” Principle to Law Faculty Hiring Policies, 10 NOVA L.J. 319 (1986).
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L.J. 259 (2017); see also Rector etc. of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,
471 (1982).
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question.130
Christianity remains the dominant religious identity in the United States.131
Thus, defining monotheist traditions of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam
frequently centers on examining how those modes of religious practices align with
Christian norms.132 It is increasingly common for Christians not to wear crosses
or other visible signs of faith, but Muslim and Jewish religious identities are
frequently associated with visible markers that establish someone is a believer of
the faith. The visible markers for Muslims are many, including having an Arabsounding name, wearing hijab (for women), having a beard (for men), or wearing
a kufi (for men). Similarly, wearing tzitzit and kippah are often recognizable
signifiers for Jewish men. Islam and Judaism both prescribe ways to live life.133 It
is more than attending a weekly service. Muslims are instructed to pray five times
a day,134 give zakat,135 perform hajj,136 not eat pork,137 etc. But what about people
who do not openly practice their faith in this way? Some Muslims do not
exclusively eat halal or practice their faith so outwardly.138 In the same way many

130. Seven days after entering office, Trump issued Executive Order 13769, Protecting the Nation
from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States. The notorious order temporarily barred
entry of refugees and nationals from seven Muslim-majority countries—Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Syria, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen—with an indefinite ban on refugees from Syria. Exec.
Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan 27, 2017); Michael D. Shear & Helen Cooper,
Trump Bars Refugees and Citizens of 7 Muslim Countries, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/politics/trump-syrian-refugees.html
[https://perma.cc/GXD2-6TA8].
131. PEW RSCH. CTR., AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 3 (May 12, 2015),
https://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/
[https://perma.cc/6BTL-ZTS4].
132. I primarily focus on monotheist religions because accommodation issues differ when the
claimant has a less established religious identity.
133. Both Islam and Judaism have rules of conduct. See generally Sayyid Muhammed Syeed &
Mark J. Pelavin, Children of Abraham: Jews and Muslims in Conversation, UNION FOR
REFORM
JUDAISM
&
ISLAMIC
SOC’Y
OF
N.
AM.,
http://www.rac.org/sites/default/files/Children-of-Abraham-Muslim-Jewish-Guide.pdf (last
visited Sept. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/578D-SBD5].
134. Prayer is the second pillar of Islam. See Qur’an, Sura 2:2–5, 2:43, 2:238–239,
https://quranyusufali.com/2/?hilite=%272%3A238%27 (last visited Oct. 29, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/3WHW-Y55A]; Id. at 11:114, https://quranyusufali.com/11/ (last visited
Sept. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/G35W-ZWN2]; Id. at 17:78–79, 17:110,
https://quranyusufali.com/17/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/HW33-DXF3].
135. Zakat is the third pillar of Islam. Muslims are required to give charitably, as discussed in the
Qur’an. E.g. Qur’an, Al A’raf 7:156, https://quranyusufali.com/7/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/ET6W-6F88]; Qur’an, Maryam 19:31, 19:55, https://quranyusufali.com/19/
(last visited Sept. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3FZH-QWA9]. Qur’an, Al Anbiya 21:73 (Yusel
Ali), https://quranyusufali.com/21/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YTJ3JUK8].
136. Qur’an, Al-Baqara 2:173 (Yusel Ali), https://quranyusufali.com/2/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/P6XF-7V7H].
137. Id.
138. See Shuja Haider, Culturally Muslim, JEWISH CURRENTS (Aug. 16, 2018),
https://jewishcurrents.org/culturally-muslim/ [https://perma.cc/QCP5-52H5]. See also David
Shariatmadari, Time for Cultural Muslims to Come Out, GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2009),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/mar/25/religion-muslimscommunity-identity [https://perma.cc/75QE-BTFS].
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American Jews might only attend synagogue during the High Holy Days,139 there
are Muslims who consider themselves fully Muslim, but they are only visibly seen
as such during Ramadan.140
Despite their diversity, Muslims are depicted as a monolithic group that has
been positioned as foreign intruder and terrorist in the post-9/11 world.141 Merging
the religious identity with terrorism allowed the Trump v. Hawaii Court to support
the Administration’s national security interest and apply a rational basis level of
review.142 Ultimately, these religious identity markers create a binary religious
identity for those who are devoutly religious and those who are culturally Jewish
or culturally Muslim. The identity delineation still results in a classification of
those who are—Christians and non-Christians.
The intersectional identity of Muslim women especially suffers from binary
classification. The head scarf has become both an intrafaith and interfaith
identifier. As such, in Muslim communities, women are frequently described as
hijabeesees or nonhijabeesee.143 Those with an aversion to Islam have manipulated
the head scarf identity marker to portray Muslim women as invisible, silenced,
meek, and veiled.144
Although the Trump administration was often transparent in its attitudes and
policies toward Muslims, one clandestine strategy was to disempower Muslims
further by framing Islam as oppressing women. When Donald Trump proselytized
that Islam oppresses women, the language enabled his administration to gain
additional allies against Muslims and supporters for the war on terrorism.145 As a
presidential candidate, Donald Trump used this strategy when he assailed Ghazala
Khan for silently standing next to her husband when her husband spoke at the
Democratic National Convention about the bravery of their deceased son, U.S.
Army Captain Humayun Khan.146 Donald Trump attributed Ghazala Khan’s
silence to Islamic principles that prohibited her from speaking. But in fact, she was
a mother mourning the loss of her only son.147
The incident sparked the #CanYouHearUsNow campaign, a social media
strategy advocates used to ensure Muslim women’s voices were not only heard,

139. See Haider, supra note 138 (discussing the idea of being culturally Muslim and culturally
Jewish).
140. EEOC v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, LLC, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1011 (D. Ariz. 2006).
141. Under the Bush administration, Congress swiftly amended the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) and enacted the United and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, commonly
referenced as the USA PATRIOT Act.
142. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018).
143. Within the Muslim community, Muslim women are often defined by whether or not they wear
a head scarf (hijab).
144. Aziz, From the Oppressed, supra note 22, at 192.
145. Rafia Zakaria, Why Donald Trump Needs Muslim Women, NATION (Aug. 11, 2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/why-donald-trump-needs-muslim-women/
[https://perma.cc/326T-R6E9].
146. Fury as Trump Mocks Muslim Soldier’s Mother Ghazala Khan, BBC NEWS (July 31, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-36935175 [https://perma.cc/2J6J-7DJG].
147. Id.
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but amplified.148 With social media posts, media interviews, and opinion
editorials, Muslim women shared their experiences as women united across class,
race, and ethnicity.149 However, the movement did little to dismantle the
framework of the oppressed Muslim woman. Instead, Western society continues
to portray Muslim women as not only oppressed but also in need of being saved.150
As part of the narrative of needing to be saved, there is an underlying
message that Muslim women are forced to wear hijab and, in some instances, fullface or body coverings.151 Even well-intentioned activists promote the Muslim
women oppression framework and use the veil as the symbol of oppression.152
When Muslim students and allies at Spelman College promoted World Hijab
Day,153 Spelman faculty drafted a letter opposing the event.154 The professors
highlighted the plight of Iraqi women forced to wear hijab, not the American
Muslim women who face harassment and attacks because they choose to wear the
identifying head covering.155 Despite their good intentions, the professors
overlooked the political dimension of their statement and the agency principles
embedded in feminist thought, which support women defining themselves in
empowering ways.156 They also overlooked the gender equity principles

148. Simra Marjiam, Can You Hear Us Now: An Ongoing Movement to Raise the Voices of Muslim
Women, HUFF. POST (Aug. 1, 2017, 7:05pm), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/can-you-hearus-now-an-ongoing-movement-to-raise-the_b_59810888e4b0b35d274c5e82
[https://perma.cc/2CDD-22SS.
149. Dana Liebelson, Muslim American Fire Back at Trump: ‘Can You Hear Us Now?’, HUFF.
POST (Aug. 1, 2016, 2:59pm), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/muslim-women-trump-canyou-hear-us-now_n_579f8ad3e4b0e2e15eb69922 [https://perma.cc/3WKW-XRK2].
150. Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?, 104 AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL
ASS’N 783, 785 (Sep. 2002) (describing the full body veil as a liberating invention and the war
on terrorism a misconceived attempt to free Muslim women from bondage).
151. Amara S. Chaudhry-Kravitz, The New Facially Neutral “Anti-Shariah” Bills: A Constitutional
Analysis, 20 WASH. & LEE J. C.R.. & SOC. JUST. 25, 33 (2013); Anissa Helie & Marie Ashe,
Multiculturalist Liberalism and Harms to Women: Looking Through the Issue of “The Veil”,
19 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 23 (2012).
152. Islamic jurisprudence supports that Muslim women do not need saving. Historically, Muslim
women have had more legal and social rights than women in most Western societies. For
example, it is Islamic tradition for Muslim women to retain their last name upon marriage to
reinforce that they are not their husband’s property. Despite the gender equity principles
embedded in Islamic jurisprudence, oppression of Muslim women is incorrectly attributed to
the Islamic religion. Abed Awad, A Muslim American Reflects on the 100th Anniversary of the
19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, MEDIUM: ABED AWAD BLOG (July 4, 2020),
https://medium.com/@awadabed2000/a-muslim-american-reflects-on-the-100th-anniversaryof-the-19th-amendment-to-the-u-s-constitution-33a516a4fe08
[https://perma.cc/KCF9SL8B]. For those who misunderstand Islamic jurisprudence, the veil is a symbol of gender
oppression. See generally Aziz, From the Oppressed, supra note 22, at 191.
153. WORLD HIJAB DAY, https://worldhijabday.com/ (last visited May 17, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/Y597-AT69].
154. Nisa Muhammad, Hijab and the Policing of Black Women and Girls: Black Muslims Respond,
SAPELO SQUARE (Mar. 7, 2018), https://sapelosquare.com/2018/03/07/the-policing-of-blackmuslim-women-and-girls-with-their-hijab-black-muslims-respond/ [https://perma.cc/R749MR7L].
155. See id.
156. See Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1999).
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embedded in Islamic jurisprudence.157
Assigning the hijab as the dominant Muslim women’s identity marker helps
reinforce the notion that Muslim women are outsiders. Muslim women who
choose to veil their face completely are even further down the Muslim women
oppression spectrum.158 The veil has been systematically attacked on both
domestic and international fronts, and it remains a common symbol associated
with the oppression of Muslim women.

D. African-American Muslim Women: The Challenges of Identity
Convergence
To be African-American, Muslim, and a woman has additional
challenges.159 While patriarchy affects all women, white Muslim women are
usually adored and welcomed in American Muslim communities.160 Conversely,
because of pervasive anti-Blackness norms, African-American Muslim women
find themselves ostracized in both Christian and Muslim societies: non-AfricanAmerican Muslim communities degrade them because of their African-American
heritage and non-Muslim communities discriminate against them because of their
religion.161
Isolating these intersectional identities pushes African-American women to
the margins162 and further destroys their psychological, economic, and
constitutional safeguards of religious freedom in a pluralistic society.163 The risk
of losing these safeguards seems to coerce these women into masking their layered
157. See generally Aziz, From the Oppressed, supra note 22, at 219–20 (describing how some
Western multiculturalists and “Muslim feminists” believe that the headscarf is not antifeminist or a tool of oppression).
158. See Faegheh Shirazi & Smeeta Mishra, Young Muslim Women on the Face Veil (Niqab): A
Tool of Resistance in Europe but Rejected in the United States, 13 INT’L J. CULTURAL STUD.
43, 44–47 (2010).
159. In discussing demarginalizing women of color who are often silenced, Professor Wing stated,
“we must analyze the holistic identities, rather than examining them from a black perspective
today and from a woman’s perspective tomorrow.” Adrien Katherine Wing, Global Critical
Race Feminism Post 9-11: Afghanistan, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 19, 30 (2002).
160. See generally Yasmine Flodin-Ali, What Malcom X Taught Me About Muslim America,
RELIGION & POL. (May 22, 2018), https://religionandpolitics.org/2018/05/22/what-malcolmx-taught-me-about-muslim-america/ [https://perma.cc/8D3R-KMGS] (comparing the author’s
experience as a half-Swedish, half-Pakistani woman in the Muslim community in Brooklyn
with the experience of a West African Muslim international student at an undergraduate
university’s Muslim Student Association); cf. Aina Khan, Britain’s Black Muslims: Ignored,
Discriminated
and
Resisting,
AL
JAZEERA
(June
22,
2018),
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/6/22/britains-black-muslims-ignoreddiscriminated-and-resisting [https://perma.cc/9GKF-UUV7] (explaining the tenth-century
practice of differentiating slaves based on the color of their skin: the Arabic word “abd” (slave)
described both enslaved and free Black people, and the Arabic word “mamluk” described
enslaved white people. Even when Arabic-speaking Muslim countries enslaved them both,
mamluk were considered superior to abd).
161. See KHALED BEYDOUN, AMERICAN ISLAMOPHOBIA: UNDERSTANDING THE ROOTS AND RISE
OF FEAR, 162–70 (2018).
162. See Wing, supra note 159, at 30.
163. See Aziz, From the Oppressed supra note 22, at 223–224; Byng, supra note 14, at 474–75.
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identities.
Professor Yoshino defined the spectrum of identity muting as converting,
passing, and covering.164 Converting is the most extreme, with the individual
totally abandoning an identity trait and fully assimilating to the status quo.165 For
an extreme example, gay people may use conversion “therapy” to fully change
their sexual orientation to straight.166 As an example of passing, fair-skinned
African Americans have often passed as white to benefit from the privileges
associated with whiteness, including freedom from slavery and other societal
benefits of housing, employment, and travel.167 Covering is the lowest level of
identity muting, but it has various nuances. It may include shifting from ethnic
dress to traditional business suits, changing natural hairstyles to straightened hair,
or shifting ethnic dialect.168 Many of these shifts help their wearers assimilate and
allow white people to feel more comfortable with behaviors associated with
otherness. Coerced masking may happen at any level on Professor Yoshino’s
spectrum of identity muting. Implicit in coerced masking is the Hobson’s choice
of masking or being one’s authentic self and losing essential societal benefits, such
as protection from police brutality or access to employment and other economic
opportunities. The next section examines the masking of identity in its various
forms and reveals how Black Muslim women experience unique challenges when
masking identity to gain legal protections.
II. MASKING IDENTITY
The African-American poet Paul Laurence Dunbar wistfully addressed
masking one’s authentic self in “We Wear the Mask”:
We wear the mask that grins and lies,
It hides our cheeks and shades our eyes,—
This debt we pay to human guile;
With torn and bleeding hearts we smile,
And mouth with myriad subtleties.169

Dunbar used the phrase “wear the mask” as both a metaphor for the pain
associated with muting racial identity and as a literary description of the features
and purpose of being “mask[ed].” Other literary artists have addressed masking,
including the white poet John Marston who wrote, “Her mask so hinders me, I
cannot see her beauty’s dignity.”170 Whereas Marston depicted a literal mask that
covered the beauty of its (white) wearer, Dunbar wrote of the figurative mask that
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See generally Yoshino, supra note 19.
See id. at 785–86.
See id. at 784–85.
See id. at 925–27.
See id. at 811–12.
PAUL LAURENCE DUNBAR, THE COLLECTED POETRY OF PAUL LAURENCE DUNBAR 71
(Joanne Braxton ed., 1993) (1913).
170. KATHERINE LESTER & BESS VIOLA OERKE, ACCESSORIES OF DRESS: AN ILLUSTRATED
ENCYCLOPEDIA 101 (2004).
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Black people feel they must wear to hide their identity—and the suffering that is
bound up in that identity—from the rest of the world.
A mask performs both literal and figurative acts of protection for its wearer.
A physical mask can protect against chemical hazards, serving as a safety
mechanism to purify air and prevent other intrusions into the body.171 A physical
mask can also allow wearers to have dual identities: the person underneath the
mask and the new masked persona that allows them to perform actions that wearers
could not or would not perform otherwise,172 such as hiding their face to rob a
bank, terrify or amuse others during Halloween, or participate in an Eyes Wide
Shut173 level of debauchery. In other areas of society, such as the law, wearing a
figurative mask can protect against discrimination, hate crimes,174 or emotional
harm.175
Indeed, the symbolism of the mask is multidimensional and deeply rooted in
various cultures and societies. To illustrate, throughout the African diaspora, the
mask has had various purposes and diverse meanings depending on the country
and ethnic group.176 In some instances, traditional masking has been part of special
gatherings, rituals, and religious ceremonies, with dancers wearing the mask to
transcend human form and assume godlike characteristics.177 Soldiers from both
ancient Greece and ancient Rome used Gorgon masks or masks of Athena,
goddess of war, to terrify their enemies.178 In ancient Greece, the tragic mask was
also used to conceal human nature, while the comedic mask represented the
possibility of human nature.179 In Black oral folklore, masks were used to depict
the trickster character—one who works to destroy someone with oppressive power
over them.180 Dunbar and other Black writers used the trickster persona to describe

171. I refer to discrimination as an intrusion because, beyond the economic harm, discrimination
has the capacity to create psychological trauma.
172. The classic example would be Batman, who wears a mask to conceal his true identity as the
billionaire Bruce Wayne, an action that transforms him into a crime-fighting superhero.
BATMAN, DC COMICS, https://www.dccomics.com/characters/batman (last visited on Oct. 29,
2020) [https://perma.cc/3JZS-53HR].
173. Eyes Wide Shut is a film that was notable for its sexually explicit scenes. The film centers a
masked orgy and, in popular culture, has become synonymous with anonymous sexual
depravity. EYES WIDE SHUT (Stanley Kubrick Productions 1999).
174. See James G. Bell & Barbara Perry, Outside Looking In: The Community Impacts of AntiLesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Hate Crime, 62 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 98, 112–115 (2015)
(finding that masking sexual orientation can protect against potential hate crimes but causes
psychological harm).
175. See id.
176. CAROL FINLEY, THE ART OF AFRICAN MASKS: EXPLORING CULTURAL TRADITIONS 9-10
(1999).
177. Ladislas Segy, Mask in African Dance, 16 NEGRO HIST. BULL. 99, 99 (Feb. 1953).
178. Id.
179. Thalia was depicted in a comedic mask, and her sister Melpomene wore the mask of tragedy.
DAVID WEST, SOME CULTS OF GREEK GODDESSES AND FEMALE DAEMONS OF ORIENTAL
ORIGIN 155 (Kevelaer et al. eds., 1995).
180. Trudier Harris writes, “By definition, tricksters are animals or characters who, while ostensibly
disadvantaged and weak in a contest of wills, power, and/or resources, succeed in getting the
best of their larger, more powerful adversaries. Tricksters achieve their objectives through
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enslaved Africans covering their abolitionist message with one that made white
people feel comfortable.181 Masks can serve many purposes within their given
geographical, historical, and social context.
For the inverted masking paradigm, I adopt the word masking as both a
literal and figurative reference to what has been so embedded in Black traditions:
hiding one’s identity or adopting a new one as a survival strategy.182 The word’s
deep roots have seeds planted in African ceremonial dances that subsequently
sprung forth in various literary devices, including Paul Laurence Dunbar’s poetry.
The term is also rich with nuanced meaning that exists in the law.183 Although
masking may exist on a spectrum, it often remains an attempt to assimilate into
society to gain full citizenship and avoid societal backlash and economic harm.184
As examined below, the levels of masking have both social and legal functions
and consequences.
A. Masking to Assimilate
Social integration is often measured by political ideologies, group
association, entertainment preference, dress, neighborhood selection, vehicle
choice, friends, and vocal expression.185 These seemingly superficial
measurements are identity benchmarks; masking these culturally identifiable
preferences is one way to remove “otherness” associated with a perceived
marginalized identity.186 Social integration includes both conscious and
unconscious displays or performance of relevant norms that support dominant
group identity.187 These performance demands often lead an individual to reveal
the traits she anticipates are most acceptable and mask those traits considered
socially undesirable before a particular audience.188
The lowest level of masking usually includes toning down one’s identity to
better assimilate. One African-American Muslim woman described her quest to

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

indirection and mask-wearing . . . .” Trudier Harris, The Trickster in African American
Literature,
NAT’L
HUMAN.
CTR.
(Sept.
26,
2019),
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/freedom/1865-1917/essays/trickster.htm
[https://perma.cc/UU2P-FT6Q].
Viktor Osinubi, Privileging the African Metaphysics of Presence in American Slave Culture:
The Example of Charles W. Chesnutt’s “The Passing of Grandison,” 43 STUD. LITERARY
IMAGINATION 47, 47 (Fall 2010).
See id. at 48–50.
See generally WE WEAR THE MASK, supra note 15 (providing accounts of various incidents
of people passing to gain acceptance).
See Bell & Perry, supra note 174, at 98–120 (finding that masking sexual orientation is used
to protect against potential hate crimes but causes psychological harm).
Klein et al., supra note 51, at 30–31.
See id. at 32–33.
Id. at 31; Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale
on White Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 425, 459–61 (2014).
See GOFFMAN, supra note 48, at 43, 51. This identity metamorphose encapsulates Goffman’s
performance of identity and the spectrum of identity assimilation Professor Yoshino explored
in Covering. See Yoshino, supra note 19, at 769.
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make people feel comfortable at her big law firm.189 She recognized the implicit
dress codes that served as a proxy for judgment, and she changed the color scheme
of her headscarf to dark tones to reduce its visibility.190 Although a small level of
masking, she still attempted to shift to what she perceived as the group norm by
toning down her Muslim identity—what Professor Yoshino would describe as
“covering” her authentic self.191 For other Muslim women, covering may mean
tying their hijab in a nonthreatening style, such as an African galee or fashion
turban. She may decide to wear modest Western clothing instead of
overgarments—a full-length cover coat that goes over street clothes.192
The motivations behind masking vary just as the levels of masking do. I have
seen some Muslims minimize their religious identity to assimilate into white
Christian society but remain actively engaged in Muslim advocacy issues, like the
trickster character of folklore who uses a mask to achieve their end in an
oppressive society. By contrast, I have seen others behave more like the Uncle
Tom persona and simply believe that they have been fully accepted into
mainstream society by masking their Islamic identity.193 Masking at this level can
aptly be termed “acting white,” where individuals assimilate by adopting white
culture, leading white people to feel a bit more comfortable with their otherness.194
Yet an online comment responding to Candace Owens’s statement that racism is
over reminds readers how ineffective masking may be:
I see you, leaning hard into whiteness as if it’ll save you. We’ve tried it for
generations; it won’t. Like Candace, you ain’t ever gonna be one of them, no
matter what. Look after your own . . . instead of lowering yourself to be the
non-white pet of people who don’t really want you in their house.195

The comment highlights that when traces of the marginalized identity exist,
assimilation is never fully effective in removing the otherness. Perhaps the
September 11 attacks were the reckoning moment when Muslims recognized that
they were the “pet of people who don’t really want [them] in their house.”196
Muslims were no longer exotics from a foreign land, but foreign terrorists. The

189. Christine Hauser, How Professionals of Color Say They Counter Bias at Work, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec.
12,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/us/racial-bias-work.html
[https://perma.cc/S7RU-84SQ].
190. See id.
191. Id.; see Yoshino, supra note 19, at 811–12.
192. See Aziz, From the Oppressed, supra note 22, at 229.
193. See generally Adena Spingarn, When ‘Uncle Tom’ Became an Insult, ROOT (May 17, 2010),
https://www.theroot.com/when-uncle-tom-became-an-insult-1790879561
[https://perma.cc/RLB2-N892].
194. See PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (2000).
195. Dildoswaggins, Comment to Monique Judge, Candace Owens Thinks Racism Is ‘Over’
Because She Has ‘Never Been a Slave.”, ROOT (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://www.theroot.com/candace-owens-thinks-racism-is-over-because-she-has1833034080 [https://perma.cc/B4WM-2U3H].
196. Id.; see Muneer Ahmad, Homeland Insecurities: Racial Violence the Day After September 11,
20 SOC. TEXT 101, 110 (2002).
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Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii implicitly endorsed this position.197
African-American Muslim women may engage in this lower level of
masking, allowing them to assimilate into white Christian society more easily. On
the other hand, intersectional identities and intracommunity racism coerce some
African-American Muslim women to tone down their African-American heritage
to prove that they are Muslim enough to non-Black Muslims.198 They may attend
a non-Black mosque, wear hijab or overgarments in the style of Arab Muslims,
and use Arabic phrases. Intracommunity racism remains a barrier to full
assimilation. Regardless of their dress, their African-American heritage is a barrier
to being perceived as having an authentic Islamic identity.199
Ironically, stereotypes about Muslim women being foreign intruders often
allow African-American Muslim women to assimilate into non-Muslim
communities more easily.200 Perhaps this dichotomy exists because others
perceive African-American Muslims as less of outsiders to the American
mainstream.201 However, the role of race remains a determinant in who is really
Muslim. For instance, despite his anti-Muslim sentiments, Trump stated during
his presidential election that he would consider not banning all Muslims from
entering the country, such as Scottish Muslims.202 Trump’s statement highlights
the intersection between race and religion, an intersection that reinforces the
power of whiteness—even in subrogated classes.203
Trump’s statement also highlights the assimilation myth. It is a myth that
suggests all Americans have a shared identity.204 That identity is not based on
patriotism but on ethnocentric values that seek to alienate those who refuse to
assimilate into the proverbial melting pot of North American society.205 Such
assimilation often requires people who are not white, Christian, or cisgender men
to dissolve traces of their race, religion, or gender to belong.206
Although contrary to contemporary constitutional thought, policies and laws

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

203.
204.
205.
206.

See generally Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2434.
See BEYDOUN, supra note 161, at 162–70.
See id.
See Karen Fraser Wyche, African American Muslim Woman: An Invisible Group, 51 SEX
ROLES 319, 323 (2004).
See BEYDOUN, supra note 161, at 162–70.
See Jenna Johnson, Trump Now Proposes Only Muslims from Terrorism-Heavy Countries
Would Be Banned from U.S., WASH. POST (June 26, 2016, 10:05 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/06/25/trump-now-saysmuslim-ban-only-applies-to-those-from-terrorism-heavy-countries/ [https://perma.cc/E5Y277JQ].
See Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1714 (1993) (examining
the social construct of race, including the intersection of race, power, and property ownership).
See Elaine S. Sylvester, Belonging: Race or Categories, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 737, 739–40
(2017); Booth, supra note 59, at 250.
See Ahmed, supra note 21, at 130–132; Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2434–36 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
See Peter G. Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious Freedom in
International Law, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 22, 31–32 (1998); see generally Harris, supra note
203 (describing a theory of “passing and trespassing” that supports the notion that “others” are
not worthy of the rights embedded in the Constitution).
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continue to uphold the melting pot ideology and encourage identity masking.207
The highest level of masking eliminates one’s identity to assimilate fully into
white Christian society—a level of assimilation Professor Yoshino refers to as
converting.208 On the same level as converting is coerced masking, such as
legislation mandating Muslim women remove hijab, face veils, and burqas.209 In
the Title VII context, coerced masking occurs when employers require a Muslim
woman to remove her hijab210 or a Muslim man to shave his beard.211
B. Legislated Masking212
Legislated masking occurs when individuals feel coerced to mask their
identity in response to legislation. The masking can occur to gain legal rights and
protections or by specific legislative demand.213 People from marginalized
communities have masked to protect themselves from discrimination.214 For
example, African Americans sometimes passed as white to escape slavery,215 Jim
Crow laws, and other vestiges of racism.216 During World War II, people of
Japanese descent masked their Japanese ancestry to avoid internment and other
consequences of ethnic bias.217 Many in the LGBTQ community have also masked
to avoid prosecution under sodomy laws, serve in the military, and maintain
employment.218 This level of coerced masking allows marginalized groups to skirt
the law or gain protections under the law.
Specific legislation has also explicitly forced many marginalized groups,
including Muslim women, to mask aspects of their identity to gain legal rights and

207. See Julia Higgins, The Rise and Fall of the Melting Pot, THE WILSON Q. (Dec. 5, 2015),
https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/stories/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-american-melting-pot/
[https://perma.cc/WDA8-KD3D]; cf. Rebecca Tsosie, Climate Change and Indigenous
Peoples: Comparative Models of Sovereignty, 26 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 239, 249 (2013).
208. See Yoshino, supra note 19, at 785.
209. See generally Shaira Nanwani, The Burqa Ban: An Unreasonable Limitation on Religious
Freedom or Justifiable Restriction?, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1431 (2011).
210. See Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2030.
211. See Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria, 134 F. Supp. 2d 591, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
212. I use the term “legislated masking” to reference policies that openly coerce or require groups
to mute their identity to participate in and benefit from basic societal programs.
213. See Hussein, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
214. Paul Horwitz, Uncovering Identity, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1285–86 (2007). See, e.g., Dirk
Johnson, Are Homosexuals the New Enemy?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1993, at A16 (documenting
the level of discrimination against gay men in the military).
215. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 423 (1857).
216. There is also a history of African Americans who refused to pass and mask their identity,
which also had consequences. See JAMES WELDON JOHNSON, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN
EX-COLORED MAN (1912) (documenting the trauma associated with living a white life with a
Black consciousness). It stands to reason that Muslims forced to mask their identity would
experience similar trauma.
217. See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942) (authorizing the imprisonment of
Japanese Americans).
218. See generally Yoshino, supra note 19 (detailing the layers of masking in the LGBTQ
community); Brown, supra note 66. The landmark case Bostock has recently interpreted Title
VII to protect employees from discrimination based on their sexual orientation. 590 U.S. ___
(2020).
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protections.219 The military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, which required
“gay[s] and lesbians” to mute their identity to serve in the military, is likely the
most widely known contemporary legislated masking example in America.220
However, Muslim women have also been a persistent target of legislated masking.
In twentieth-century Muslim Uzbekistan, the Soviet “modernization” campaign
sought to liberate Uzbek women by having them remove their full-body veils.221
Although Soviet propaganda promoted these veil-removal policies (hujum) as a
movement for gender equity, some Muslim women perceived the hujum as
removing an Islamic identity marker and undermining the hold of Islam (and its
religious leaders).222 This flawed campaign operated on the premise that Islam,
not cultural appropriation of the religion, oppressed women.223 It also overlooked
that in the seventh century, Muslim women had many legal rights that not even
American women had until the nineteenth century—capacity to contract, marry,
and own and inherit property.224 Yet the veil remained a symbol of both oppression
and resistance against assimilation.225
The twenty-first century has not been much better. Europe has legislated
various iterations of banning full face and body coverings (colloquially known as
the “burqa ban”).226 The underlying message of these bans frames Muslim women
as outsiders who needed to assimilate by removing their identity-based clothing.227
After Austria successfully banned the burqa,228 Quebec also barred public workers
from wearing the burqa and required women to remove their face veils when riding
public transit or receiving government services.229
Legislators in the United States have attempted similar strategies to legislate
Muslim women’s masking.230 In 2016, Georgia State Representative Jason

219. See Higgins, supra note 207; cf. Tsosie, supra note 207 (describing how the melting-pot
ideology does not resonate with Indigenous people because their cultures are not lived in
“private”).
220. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2010) (repealed).
221. DOUGLAS NORTHROP, VEILED EMPIRE: GENDER AND POWER IN STALINIST CENTRAL ASIA
199 (2016).
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. Awad, supra note 152.
225. NORTHROP, supra note 221, at 185–86.
226. The
Islamic
Veil
Across
Europe,
BBC
NEWS
(May
31,
2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13038095 [https://perma.cc/5BU5-PZG2]; See
S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014).
227. Nanwani, supra note 209.
228. Rick Noack, Austria’s New Anti-Burqa Law Isn’t Quite Working as Intended, WASH. POST
(Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/09/austriawanted-to-ban-burqas-now-it-also-fines-mascots-and-stops-cyclists-who-wear-scarves/
[https://perma.cc/L234-TYZT].
229. Dan Levin, Quebec Bars People in Face Coverings from Receiving Public Services, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/world/canada/quebec-facecoverings-ban.html [https://perma.cc/C986-SEMH].
230. See, e.g., Sharon Schmickle, Bill in Legislature Prompts Dispute Over Muslim Women’s
Headscarves, MINN. POST (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.minnpost.com/politicspolicy/2009/03/bill-legislature-prompts-dispute-over-muslim-womens-headscarves/
[https://perma.cc/7G9C-XLNR].
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Spencer introduced a bill that would have banned Muslim women from wearing a
burqa and any face coverings.231 Spencer’s bill reflected a desire to preserve
American society as white and Christian: “This bill is simply a response to
constituents that do have concerns of the rise of Islamic terrorism, and we in the
State of Georgia do not want our laws used against us.”232 However, when
opponents challenged the constitutionality of the proposed legislation, Spencer
rescinded the bill and explained that it was intended to address threats from
“masked terrorists,” but not any specific group.233
Legislated masking to gain access to legal protections also occurs in the
broader Muslim community. Some Muslim refugees convert to Christianity—thus
masking their prior religious identities—to strengthen asylum applications to
Canada, the United States, and Germany.234 Since an asylee may base an
application on a well-founded fear of persecution, converting to Christianity may
help to create the perception of such a fear.235 Although Christians are generally
not persecuted in Muslim-majority countries, some Islamic scholars consider it a
crime punishable by death when Muslims convert to Christianity.236 Although
advocates advise refugees that converting is not necessary to strengthen their
applications,237 immigration policies—such as the Muslim Ban—seem to suggest
otherwise.238
Masking one’s identity, whether to avoid punishment or to access
protections, has consequences. In addition to the potential psychological
231. The original version of the statute provided: “A person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he or
she wears a mask, hood, or device by which any portion of the face is so hidden, concealed, or
covered as the conceal the identity of the wearer and is upon any public way or public property
or upon the private property of another without the written permission of the owner or occupier
of the property to do so.” Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-38 (West 2019); Spencer sought to change
the gender to he or she, so that the bill would include women wearing niqab. H.B. 3, 2016
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016).
232. Associated Press, Georgia Lawmaker Drops No-Mask Proposal after Muslim Backlash, FOX
NEWS (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/georgia-lawmaker-drops-no-maskproposal-after-muslim-backlash [https://perma.cc/J97G-W626].
233. Id.; Aaron Diamant, Lawmaker Withdraws Bill Banning Women from Wearing Burqas in
Public, WSB-TV (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/new-bill-would-banwomen-from-wearing-burqas-for-drivers-license-photos/467901403/
[https://perma.cc/8E6M-56XD].
234. See, e.g., Josie Ensor, The Muslim Refugees Converting to Christianity ‘to Find Safety,’
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/30/muslim-refugeesconverting-christianity-find-safety/ [https://perma.cc/NL6S-4URM]; Lizzie Dearden, Muslim
Refugees Are Converting to Christianity in Germany, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/muslim-refugees-converting-christianitygermany-crisis-asylum-seekers-migrants-iran-afghanistan-syria-eritrea-a7466611.html
[https://perma.cc/35C4-REWP]. Khaled Beydoun and Erika Wilson explore this veiling of
identity in racial identity as “reverse passing.” Khaled Beydoun & Erika Wilson, Reverse
Passing, 64 UCLA L. REV. 282, 309 (2017).
235. See Ensor, supra note 234.
236. JOHN ESPOSITO, WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT ISLAM, 73–75 (2nd ed.
2011). The issue of apostacy is nuanced and this sentence is not intended to explain the schools
of Islamic law on the topic or jurist in-depth analysis of the issue.
237. See Dearden, supra note 234.
238. See Holger Sonntag, Testing Religion: Adjudicating Claims of Religious Prosecution Brought
by Iranians in the U.S. and Germany, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 975, 986–88 (2018).
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trauma,239 masking religious identity has legal implications in the Title VII
context. As explained in the next section, Muslims who mask to safeguard against
discrimination often find that masking is used against them to deny religious
accommodation requests—particularly requests by Muslim women who remove
the veil or fail to perform their religious identity.
III. INVERTED MASKING
Although Safoorah Khan made a successful Title VII claim against her
employer, employers are still inclined to question religious accommodations when
their employees’ performance of their religious identity is inconsistent with what
the employer knows about the religious practice.240 It is this binary framework of
religious identity that often leads employers to challenge accommodation requests
when the requesting employee’s religious practices deviate from what the
employer observes from other employees of the same religion.241 This “deviation
factor” also suggests employers are less familiar with minority religions and
require training.242 Consequently, employers largely rely on uninformed
understandings of Islamic practices to assess their Muslim employees’ religious
practices.
A. Establishing a Sincerely Held Belief: Legal Standard
To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that she has “a bona fide religious belief that conflicts
with an employment requirement.”243 She must also establish that the
accommodation was a motivating factor in the adverse action.244 If an employee
establishes these elements, the burden shifts to the employer to establish a good
faith effort to reasonably accommodate the religious belief or to prove that the
accommodation would cause undue hardship to the employer’s business.245
However, the analytical framework to determine whether an employee’s
religious belief is “truly held” is becoming increasingly contentious because the
standard is unclear and inconsistent.246 Although assessing sincerely held religious
beliefs is factually driven and handled on a case-by-case basis,247 expert witnesses

239. See generally WE WEAR THE MASK, supra note 15.
240. See, e.g., Compl. at 3, Sardeye v. Walmart Stores E., LP, No. 3-18-CV-01261, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 154118 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2019).
241. See, e.g., id.
242. See Dina Gerdeman, Religion in the Workplace: What Managers Need to Know, WORKING
KNOWLEDGE (Sept. 27, 2018), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/religion-in-the-workplace-whatmanagers-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/8M8U-9KXU].
243. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2nd Cir. 1985).
244. Circuit courts have been unclear about how explicit employees must be in their requests for
religious accommodations. The Supreme Court provided minimal guidance in EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2028 (2015).
245. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 432 U.S. at 74.
246. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185–186 (1965).
247. Philbrook, 757 F.2d at 481.
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are frequently used to determine the validity of an employee’s belief.248 The expert
approach is problematic because lived religion is often specific to that individual,
their family unit, or their community, rather than a standardized adherence to
textual doctrine. For example, although there are various schools of thought249 on
whether Muslim women are required to wear hijab (head covering), veil (face
covering), a burqa (full body covering), or no head covering at all,250 a Muslim
woman who subscribes to any of these four approaches sincerely believes that she
is practicing in accordance with her beliefs. Furthermore, Muslim women also
have different perspectives on when one is required to obey a religious mandate
and when one may disobey.251 As a result, should an expert testify that a Muslim
woman’s choice to wear any of the above coverings is not a requirement of the
religion, courts could overlook the subjectivity of religious interpretation and
practice.
Employees should not have to demonstrate sincerity by practicing an
objectively correct interpretation of a religion, but merely by observing what they
believe is part of their faith.252 This approach is especially compelling considering
that Title VII broadly defines religion as “all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief.”253 As such, courts should apply a similarly broad
definition of what constitutes a “truly held” or sincerely held belief.254
Furthermore, experts also tend to endorse as legitimate religious experience the
very identity markers that lead to the identity-based discrimination that Title VII
was designed to protect against. As explained below, assessing religious sincerity
through visible markers abrogates First Amendment protections and undermines
one of the purposes of Title VII—to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
religion.
B. Religious Visibility and Norms
The Supreme Court’s broad definition of religion is by design. The Court
does not want to judge religiosity.255 However, this does not stop an employer
from arguing that an employee’s requested religious accommodation is actually a
secularly motivated personal preference because the employer finds she is visibly
248. See Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a Religious Question Doctrine? Judicial Authority to Examine
Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 502–03 (2005).
249. See Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women’s Rights, 12 AM. U.
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 6–9 (1997) (explaining the five schools of Islamic thought and
traditional jurisprudence).
250. Shirazi & Mishra, supra note 158, at 44–47.
251. Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil? Muslim
Women, France and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 743, 750–52 (2006).
252. See id. (reasoning that “the ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question, there remains the
significant question whether it is ‘truly held’”); see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (holding “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical,
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection”).
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e((j) (2012).
254. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185.
255. See id. at 184 (providing religion is “intensely personal” and courts must give “great weight”
to claimants’ portrayals of their beliefs).
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inconsistent in her religious practice.256 For example, Kimberly Bloom, a bornagain Christian, requested an accommodation not to work on Sundays.257 Her
employer, Aldi Inc., denied her religious accommodation request, framed the
request as a personal preference, and used Bloom’s lack of strict religious
adherence as a basis for its argument:
Bloom . . . does not attend church; and, in fact, she has only attended on a single
occasion, since the late 1990s . . . . On Sundays, Bloom spends time with family,
reads the Bible, and watches a preacher on television . . . . She makes her own
distinctions as to what is or is not permitted on Sundays—for example, she will
play board games with her grown children but will not go to the movies, and
will go for a ride or walk but will not mow the lawn. She does not point to any
Bible passage or religious materials that make her rather self-serving
distinctions.258

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) challenged the
employer’s characterization of the request as a personal preference.259 The court
ultimately found for Bloom, reasoning that her decision not to attend church on
the Sabbath was immaterial to whether her beliefs qualify as religious for purposes
of Title VII.260 Although Bloom was ultimately successful in establishing the
sincerity of her belief, it was her antinormative Christian behavior that led the
employer to challenge the sincerity of her religious accommodation.261
In another matter, Alamo Rent-A-Car denied Bilan Nur’s request to wear
hijab during Ramadan, contending that Nur’s religious accommodation request
was not based on a sincerely held religious belief.262 In support of its position,
Alamo referenced in its brief Nur’s inconsistency in wearing a “veil” during
Ramadan the prior year: “Alamo points to evidence that during Ramadan in 2000
(the year prior to the Ramadan at issue), Alamo’s management asked Nur to
remove her head covering, and she complied, and did not assert a religious need
to object to the request.”263 Alamo’s argument relied on the ease with which Nur
willingly masked her religious identity at its request.264 The court ultimately ruled
for Nur on summary judgment, acknowledging that the employer forcing her to
256. See EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc., 108 F.3d 1569 (7th Cir. 1997) (employer argued that
Jewish employee never requested leave for Yom Kippur in her eight-year work history and
thus her religious belief was not sincerely held).
257. EEOC v. Aldi, Inc., No. 06-01210, 2009 WL 3183077, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2009).
258. Defendant Aldi’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, EEOC
v. Aldi, Inc., No. 06-01210, 2009 WL 3183077 at *12 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2009).
259. Id. at *11.
260. Id. at *12; see also Williams v. Harvey, 2006 WL 2456406 (Aug. 21, 2006) (denying
employee’s claim because the employee knew about the Sunday schedule, accepted the job
with knowledge of the rotating Sunday schedule, and later refused to work on Sunday after
ignoring reasonable accommodations offered by the employer).
261. See Defendant Aldi’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 12,
EEOC v. Aldi, Inc., 2009 WL 3183077 at *9.
262. Alamo Rent-A-Car, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1011.
263. Id. at 1009, 1011.
264. Alamo Rent-A-Car, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
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hide in the back room when she wore hijab was not a reasonable
accommodation.265
Levels of inverted masking were at play in both cases. For Bloom, Christian
norms guided her employer’s analysis of the sincerity of her religious belief. For
Bloom’s employer, the most important of these norms was the plaintiff’s lack of
adherence to what her employer determined devout Christians must do on
Sundays—go to church.266 Thus, it was not enough for Bloom’s employer that
Bloom profess that her religious beliefs prevented her from working on Sundays;
Bloom also had to perform her Christian identity according to her employer’s
expectations. The more her behavior adhered to Christian norms, the easier it was
for her employer to believe her sincerity.267 For Nur, her willingness to remove
her hijab to serve customers and assimilate at her employer’s request made her
employer question the sincerity of her religious practice.268 The temporary
masking before customers prevented Nur from securing an accommodation during
the most important month in the Islamic calendar—Ramadan. Though the court
ruled for Nur, it was her perceived lack of religious consistency that gave fodder
to the employer’s initial challenge to her sincerely held religious belief.269 Such
conduct suggests that employers believe that employees waive their right to
religious accommodation if there has been any inconsistency in their religious
practices.
In addition to religious consistency, a lack of visible religious markers, such
as a hijab or beard, also influences employers’ inclinations to challenge
employees’ sincerity.270 For example, Hilton Hotels questioned employee
Mamdouh Hussein’s claim that he needed to wear a beard for religious reasons.271
Hilton observed that Hussein had never worn a beard in the fourteen years of his
employment.272 Hussein’s employer also professed that they never knew Hussein
was Muslim until he requested the accommodation.273 In this case, the court
agreed with the employer. The court granted Hilton Hotels summary judgment,
reasoning,
Hussein has made no effort to explain why, if his religion prevented him from
265. Id. at 1017.
266. See Defendant Aldi’s Memorandum, supra note 258, at **9, 12.
267. See Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1088 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding it reasonable for
an employee to find Sunday replacement as part of an accommodation); Sturgill v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 512 F.3d 1024, 1031 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding UPS failed to reasonably
accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs when it terminated an employee who could not
find a replacement driver to complete his route that extended past sundown on a Friday).
268. See Alamo Rent-A-Car, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1011.
269. See id.; see also EEOC v. IBP. Inc, 824 F. Supp. 147, 151 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (holding subsequent
absence of faith did not establish previous religious beliefs were insincere when the employee
refused to work on his Sabbath).
270. See Hussein, 134 F. Supp. at 594 (detailing an employer that doubted the sincerity of an
employee’s religion when he failed to inform the company of his religious beliefs surrounding
facial hair until fourteen years into his employment).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 596.
273. Id.
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shaving, he had never worn a beard before. He does not contend, for example,
that he had just converted to his religion. Finally, within three months, he shaved
his beard, an undisputed fact that also undercuts his claim of religious
necessity.274

Hussein’s challenge against Hilton Hotels presents another inverted masking
model—one that relies on a lack of identity performance measured by visibility.
The court’s reliance on Hilton’s assertion that it did not know Hussein was
Muslim, and therefore lacked notice,275 established a dangerous precedent in Title
VII proceedings. The court used this lack of knowledge to bolster the employer’s
position that Hussein’s belief was not sincere.276 Such an approach suggests that
the employer expected some outward performance of Hussein’s Islamic religious
identity. Had that performance of identity existed to verify his sincerely held
belief, the employer may have hesitated to challenge Hussein’s level of sincerity.
Without visible identity markers, an employer has no reason to know an
employee’s religion, unless the employee seeks an accommodation. Furthermore,
the court’s reasoning that Hussein’s shaving his beard undercut the religious
necessity of keeping the beard overlooked that religiosity is often fluid. Thus,
Hussein’s decision to shave his beard should have no bearing on whether a belief
is sincerely held.
Measuring employees’ sincerity against other employees’ religious
performance creates similar barriers to employees securing a religious
accommodation. Walmart denied Fadumo Sardeye, a Somali Muslim woman, an
exemption from shelving alcohol and pork products.277 Sardeye believed that, as
a Muslim, she was prohibited from touching the products, and she stressed that
another Walmart store had accommodated her request for fifteen years.278 Other
employees, however, complained about Sardeye’s exemption, pointing to other
Muslim employees who had regularly shelved alcohol during their employment.279
To accommodate her request, her new manager required that Sardeye provide
Qur’anic proof that she was prohibited from touching pork and alcohol
products.280 Reliance on the Qur’an as the sole source of religious guidance is a
misunderstanding of Islamic jurisprudence and religious practice.281 Walmart also

274. See Hussein, 134 F. Supp. at 596–97.
275. See id. (recognizing the undisputed fact that Hussein never mentioned the conflict between the
employer’s policy and his religion until he was questioned about his beard; asserting Hussein
failed to give his employer notice to make an arrangement for any accommodations and
without this notice, there was no prima facie case).
276. Id.
277. Compl. at 3–4, Walmart Stores, No. 3-18-CV-01261.
278. Id. at 2–3.
279. Id. at 5; Holly Meyer, Muslim Woman Sues Walmart for Religious Discrimination After Being
Fired
from
Knoxville
Store,
TENNESSEAN
(Nov.
8,
2018),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/religion/2018/11/08/knoxville-muslim-woman-sueswalmart-religious-discrimination-lawsuit/1928776002/ [https://perma.cc/7BW8-78MR].
280. Compl. at 5, Walmart Stores, No. 3-18-CV-01261.
281. Mamoud Munes Tomeh, Persuasion and Authority in Islamic Law, 3 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E.
& ISLAMIC L. 141, 143 (2010).
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incorrectly used the religiosity of other Muslim employees as an implicit
barometer to measure Sardeye’s sincerity.282 Walmart should have measured
Sardeye’s sincerity using a subjective standard, not status quo behavior or whether
a Qur’anic mandate exists.283
In assessing the consistency of religious practices, employers discount
masking marginalized identities for personal protection.284 Attitudes toward
Muslims after the September 11 attacks highlighted the importance of
occasionally masking for personal protection.285 Conceivably, the 9/11 backlash
explains why Alamo Rent-A-Car denied Nur’s request to wear hijab during
Ramadan in 2001 but allegedly granted the same request in 1999 and 2000.286
Thus, it should not be surprising that Muslims mask their religious identity to
assimilate and avoid discrimination. After 9/11, it was also not uncommon for
Muslims to underperform their religious identity in response to religious animosity
by showing they were like others in their community and equally American.287
This divergence of responses reinforces that religious performance takes many
forms, including shifting religiosity and visibility of religious identity. Employers’
assumptions that these shifts undermine sincerely held religious beliefs invert
equal protections, creating the inverted masking paradigm.
C. Removing the Mask
We must eliminate binary narratives around religious and gender identities
to combat inverted masking in religious accommodation employment settings.
Black Muslim women offer us a glimpse at how this might be possible. While
normative assumptions of Muslim women as oppressed and meek prevail,288 Black
women are stereotyped as being angry, aggressive, loud, and sassy.289 The contrast
makes a Black Muslim woman’s identity incongruent. Such incongruous
stereotypes can contradict one another when discussed theoretically. AA’s
representation of Khan demonstrates how such binary assumptions might be
challenged in court.
AA’s presence on the litigation team for Khan allowed the DOJ to disrupt
various Muslim identity stereotypes. Arguably, as one of the lead attorneys, AA
282.
283.
284.
285.
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287.
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had the potential to dispel the notion of a binary Muslim identity before a jury—a
factor that may have led the school district to settle the case. Self-defining
moments, such as this example, are how I prescribe that Black Muslim women
continue to dismantle the effects of inverted masking.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to believe that which we cannot see. Yet faith is just that—
belief in the unseen.290 Identity is also often complicated, multilayered, and
invisible to employers. It is the coerced covering of identity—our ethnicity,
religion, and culture—that Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws seek to
protect, a protection grounded in the belief that the American fabric is woven with
multiple threads.
Well-intentioned employers must overcome identity stereotypes to
recognize that religiosity is as diverse as societal fiber. Even if courts do not want
to measure religiosity, society and employers do.291 And Muslim women are
acutely aware of the need to mask religious identity to make others feel
comfortable. Intracommunity and intercommunity racism, gender inequity,
Islamophobia, and binary identity markers have pushed Muslim women to the
margins.
Thus, when employers inappropriately use identity markers as a barometer
to assess religious sincerity in the Title VII framework, they should remember
Billie Holiday’s words: “If I go to church on Sunday / then cabaret all day Monday
/ ain’t nobody’s business if I do.”292
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